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An Error of Law and the Credibility of the Civil Resolution Tribunal
Douglas C. Harris* and Sophie Marshall**
The Civil Resolution Tribunal has made a serious error of law. The error is
straightforward and clear. Over a number of decisions, the CRT has attributed words
to the British Columbia Court of Appeal that are, instead, the words of the British
Columbia Supreme Court. The seriousness of this error is threefold. First, the CRT is
citing the BCCA decision as authority for the proposition that the BCCA rejected.
Second, in misrepresenting the BCCA decision, the CRT is changing the scope of
protection for individual strata property owners from their strata corporations.
Finally, the CRT is compounding the error by repeating it. In this comment, we
explain the error, outline its seriousness, and consider the implications for the CRT as
it works to establish its credibility and expertise in the body of law that creates and
governs strata property.
The error of law appears first in Moore v The Owners, Strata Plan KAS 1878.1
This case involved a dispute over the allocation of parking stalls. The owner claimed
that the strata corporation’s assignment of parking stalls in the common property
was significantly unfair to her, and she relied on the Civil Resolution Tribunal Act
[CRTA], section 48.1(2), which provides the CRT with authority to make an order
against a strata corporation “to prevent or remedy a significantly unfair action.”2 This
section, and section 164 of the Strata Property Act [SPA] on which it is based,3
provide individual strata property owners with protection from, and redress for, the
unjust or inequitable decisions and actions of their strata corporation.
To interpret “significantly unfair” the CRT turned to the BCCA decision in
Dollan v Strata Plan BCS 1589,4 the leading interpretation of “significantly unfair” in
the SPA. In doing so, the tribunal member in Moore wrote:
26. With reference to the Dollan v. Strata Plan BCS 1589, 2012 BCCA 44 (CanLii) case
cited by the owner, Garson J.A. developed a new test for analysis under section 164,
which I find would apply to an analysis under section 48.1(2) of the Act as follows:
1.
Examined objectively, does the evidence support the asserted
reasonable expectations of the owner?
2.
Does the evidence establish that the reasonable expectation of the
owner was violated by action that was significantly unfair?
27. I also note the court’s further comments in Dollan (my bold emphasis added):
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There is no doubt that in making a decision the Strata Corporation must give
consideration of the consequences of that decision. However, in my view, if
the decision is made in good faith and on reasonable grounds, there is little
room for a finding of significant unfairness merely because the decision
adversely affects some owners to the benefit of others. …5

The error lies in attributing “the court’s further comments” to Dollan. Garson
JA does reproduce this passage in her reasons for decision in Dollan,6 but draws it
from the BCSC decision in Peace v Strata Plan VIS 2165.7 In fact, the passage lies at
the heart of the judgment in Peace that courts should review the processes and
procedures of strata corporation decision-making for significant unfairness, but that
there is “little room” to review the consequences of those decisions. The full
paragraph from the decision in Peace is as follows:
[55] I have already referred to the wording of section 164 of the SPA. I repeat that
the focus of that section is on the conduct of the Strata Corporation and not on the
consequences of the conduct. There is no doubt that in making a decision the
Strata Corporation must give consideration of the consequences of that
decision. However, in my view, if the decision is made in good faith and on
reasonable grounds, there is little room for a finding of significant unfairness
merely because the decision adversely affects some owners to the benefit of
others. This must be particularly so when the consequence complained of is one
which is mandated by the SPA itself.8

The seriousness of the error lies, first, in the fact that Garson JA specifically
and explicitly rejected the limited scope for judicial review that the BCSC adopted in
Peace. Instead, Garson JA held that courts should not limit themselves to reviewing
processes and procedures, but must also consider the unfairness of outcomes. In her
reasons for decision, Garson JA put it this way:
[24] Section 164 is remedial. It addresses that, despite using a fair process and
holding a democratic vote, the outcome of majoritarian decision-making processes
may yield results that are significantly unfair to the interests of minority
owners. Section 164 provides a remedy to an owner who has been treated
significantly unfairly by co-owners or the strata council that represents them. The
view that significantly unfair decisions reached through a fair process are insulated
from judicial intervention would rob the section of any meaningful purpose. I agree
with what Masuhara J. said in Gentis that the outcome of the vote is one factor to be
considered in determining if the impugned action is unfair. I do not agree with the
suggestion in Pearce [sic] that provided the process is fair and democratic, a court
should defer to the decision of the strata council or corporation.9
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The justices who joined Garson JA in Dollan—Hall JA (concurring with Garson
JA in the result) and Smith JA (in dissent)—suggested greater deference to the
democratic decision-making of strata corporations in their reasons for decision, and
thus less attention to the unfairness of outcomes, but both indicated that courts
were not limited to a review of processes and procedures.10 As a result, although the
appellate justices in Dollan did not speak with one voice, it is clear that Dollan is not
authority for the principle that good-faith decision-making on reasonable grounds
will insulate a strata corporation against claims of significant unfairness. If anything,
Dollan is the standard-bearer for its opposite: courts must be attentive to processes
and to outcomes when reviewing the decisions of strata corporations for significant
unfairness to one or more strata property owners.
The CRT’s inadvertent misrepresentation of the BCSC decision in Peace as the
BCCA’s statement of the law in Dollan is not a trivial error. As Garson JA suggests, the
purpose of section 164 is to provide strata property owners with remedies where
“majoritarian decision-making processes” create significant unfairness.11 In
appearing to narrow the scope of its review of strata corporation decision-making to
processes, the CRT is limiting the access of strata property owners to the statutory
remedies, contrary to the direction from the BCCA.
Finally, the CRT is compounding the seriousness of the error by repeating it.
Since the decision in Moore, tribunal members have reproduced the same passage
from Peace, with the same attribution to Dollan, in six subsequent decisions.12 In five
of the seven decisions, the CRT determined that the actions or decisions of the strata
corporations were not significantly unfair to the applicant-owners. The CRT’s error of
law in these decisions provides the strata property owners with a clear ground for
appeal to the BCSC.13
Creating grounds for appeal in a growing list of cases is cause for concern, but
the error and its repetition should also cause the CRT to reflect on the manner in
which it uses judicial precedent and its earlier decisions as it endeavors to build
expertise and establish credibility in strata property law. In this regard, the decisions
of the CRT do not create binding precedent.14 Tribunal members are not required to
follow earlier decisions. However, even if prior decisions are not binding, consistency
in decision-making is an important value. The parties appearing at the CRT have a
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reasonable expectation that, when it comes to the final decision-making stage in the
CRT’s process, the tribunal will approach and resolve their disputes as it has
approached and resolved similar disputes in the past. As a result, tribunal members
should be consulting earlier CRT decisions in considering their decisions. But in
consulting earlier decisions, tribunal members need to be cautious about relying on
them and on their interpretations of court decisions in particular. When citing
important principles from the courts, tribunal members should turn to the court
decisions themselves. In this instance, the CRT appears to have repeated its error
because tribunal members turned to the CRT decision in Moore and to its
representation of the BCCA decision in Dollan rather than to the BCCA decision itself.
Errors of law will occur in administrative tribunal decisions. It may be that
they are more likely to occur in the early years of an administrative tribunal while it
develops its expertise. It may also be that the particular design of the CRT, with its
“shift in emphasis away from the needs of people who provide justice processes
[including lawyers] towards the people who use them,”15 means that errors of law
will occur more frequently. However, we recognize that the design of the CRT
reflected conscious and deliberate choices to enhance access to effective and
efficient strata property dispute resolution. Our purpose in this comment is not to
argue that the CRT should reorient its processes away from the needs of those who
have disputes to be resolved.
Nevertheless, we do suggest that this error of law and its repetition have
implications for the CRT and its credibility as a body charged, among other things,
with interpreting and applying strata property law. While the CRT establishes itself as
an administrative tribunal with expertise in strata property law, tribunal members
should be conscious that they are building a foundation on which strata property
dispute resolution will rest. This foundation-building occurs in the careful authoring
of individual decisions, but it may also require collective and collaborative work
among tribunal members to establish the practices of interpretation that will guide
their decision-making. It may also require drawing from the expertise of the legal
profession in strata property law, perhaps in ways that involve lawyers in roles
beyond that of advocates in an adversarial setting. Whatever the methods, the
success of the CRT will turn on its capacity to provide access to effective and efficient
dispute resolution, and on its accurate interpretation and clear application of the
body of rules, based primarily in statute and case law, that creates and governs
strata property. In fact, the former will depend, at least in part, on the latter. It is
with accessibility and credibility that the CRT will best fulfill its promise of improving
the lives of people who reside or work within the legal architecture of strata
property.
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